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ABSTRACT. Objective/context: The article explores truth commissions as processes 
that allow victims and civil society mobilization. It examines the relationship 
between victims and civil society with the governing regime in the lead up to the 
establishment of a truth commission and in the implementation of a commission’s 
recommendations. The article frames mobilization as enabling vertical 
accountability relationships following the pressure that victims and civil society exert 
on the governing regime. To support this argument, I examine the commissions 
established in 1990 in Nepal and in 1994 in Sri Lanka. Methodology: The article 
proposes evaluative criteria showing a governing regime is rendered accountable 
to pressure from civil society, in the lead up to establishing a truth commission 
and as a result of the recommendations in the final report. It then assesses whether 
or not the data collected fulfills the evaluative criteria proposed. Data has been 
collected by carrying out a literature review, including primary and secondary 
sources, and through semi-structured interviews conducted in Nepal and Sri 
Lanka between 2013 and 2015. Conclusions: The evidence collected suggests that 
a close relationship between victims, civil society, and pro-democracy political 
parties leading to the establishment of a truth commission, limits the pressure this 
civil society can exert on the implementation of recommendations, once those pro-
democracy political parties are in the new government. Originality: The analysis of 
truth commissions as processes is relevant to better understand the reasons behind 
a lack of implementation of their recommendations.
KEYWORDS: Thesaurus: civil society; Nepal; political parties; Sri Lanka. Author: 
Truth commissions; vertical accountability; victims.
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¿Sometidas a la voluntad política? Sociedad civil y movilización 
de víctimas en torno a las comisiones de la verdad
RESUMEN. Objetivo/contexto: El artículo explora las comisiones de la verdad como 
procesos que permiten la movilización social de las víctimas y de la sociedad civil. 
Examina la relación entre el régimen de gobierno y las víctimas y sociedad civil 
en el periodo previo al establecimiento de una comisión de la verdad y en la 
implementación de las recomendaciones de la comisión. El artículo considera que 
la movilización permite relaciones verticales de rendición de cuentas tras la presión 
que las víctimas y la sociedad civil ejercen sobre el régimen gobernante. Para respaldar 
este argumento, examino las comisiones establecidas en 1990 en Nepal y en 1994 en 
Sri Lanka. Metodología: El artículo propone criterios evaluativos que muestran que 
un régimen gubernamental rinde cuentas ante la presión de la sociedad civil, en el 
periodo previo al establecimiento de una comisión de la verdad, y como resultado 
de las recomendaciones del informe final. Luego evalúa si los datos recolectados 
cumplen con los criterios evaluativos propuestos. Los datos se recolectaron 
realizando una revisión de literatura, incluyendo fuentes primarias y secundarias, 
y mediante entrevistas semiestructuradas realizadas en Nepal y Sri Lanka entre 
2013 y 2015. Conclusiones: La evidencia recolectada sugiere que una relación 
cercana entre las víctimas, la sociedad civil y los partidos políticos prodemocráticos 
en el periodo previo al establecimiento de una comisión de la verdad, limita la 
presión que esta sociedad civil puede ejercer, en términos de la implementación de 
recomendaciones, cuando esos partidos políticos prodemocráticos se encuentren 
en el nuevo gobierno. Originalidad: El análisis de las comisiones de la verdad como 
procesos es relevante para comprender mejor las razones que subyacen a la falta de 
implementación de sus recomendaciones.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Thesaurus: sociedad civil; Nepal; Sri Lanka. Autor: Comisiones de 
la verdad; partidos políticos; rendición de cuentas vertical; víctimas.
Sujeito à vontade política? Sociedade civil e mobilização  
de vítimas em torno de comissões da verdade
RESUMO. Objetivo/contexto: este artigo explora as comissões da verdade como 
processos que permitem a mobilização social das vítimas e da sociedade civil. Examina 
a relação entre o regime do governo e as vítimas e a sociedade civil no período 
anterior ao estabelecimento de uma comissão da verdade e na implementação das 
recomendações da comissão. O artigo considera que a mobilização permite, depois 
da pressão que as vítimas e a sociedade civil exercem sobre o regime dominante, 
relações verticais de prestação de contas. Para respaldar esse argumento, são 
examinadas as comissões estabelecidas, em 1990, no Nepal e, em 1994, no Sri Lanka. 
Metodologia: o artigo propõe critérios avaliativos que mostram que um regime 
governamental presta contas diante da pressão da sociedade civil, no período 
anterior ao estabelecimento de uma comissão da verdade, e como resultado das 
recomendações do relatório final. Em seguida, avalia se os dados coletados atendem 
aos critérios de avaliação propostos. Os dados foram coletados por meio de uma 
revisão da literatura, incluindo fontes primárias e secundárias, e por meio de 
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entrevistas semiestruturadas realizadas no Nepal e no Sri Lanka entre 2013 e 2015. 
Conclusões: a evidência coletada sugere que uma relação próxima entre vítimas, 
sociedade civil e partidos políticos pró-democráticos no período anterior ao 
estabelecimento de uma comissão da verdade, limita a pressão que essa sociedade 
civil pode exercer, em termos de implementação de recomendações, quando os 
partidos políticos pró-democráticos estão no novo governo. Originalidade : a 
análise das comissões da verdade como processos é relevante para entender melhor 
as razões subjacentes à falta de implementação de suas recomendações.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Thesaurus: sociedade civil; Nepal; Partidos Políticos; Sri Lanka. 
Autor: Comissões da Verdade; prestação de contas vertical; vítimas.
Introduction: Truth Commissions as Processes
One of the recent critiques of transitional justice and research on the impact of 
transitional justice mechanisms is their focus on preconceived outcomes rath-
er than on the process and how this process links to an outcome. Gready and 
Robins join others in advocating for a change from transitional to transformative 
justice. Transformative justice would propose, among other measures, “a focus on 
civil society participation in the design and implementation of transitional justice 
mechanisms” (Lambourne 2009, 28). For Gready and Robins,
Transformative justice and transformative participation require more focus 
on process, on the interface between process and outcomes and on mobi-
lization, and less focus on preconceived outcomes. Such mobilization can 
take place around court proceedings, truth commissions or reparations 
advocacy, or simply around the needs of victims and citizens. It can seek to 
support, shape or contest such mechanisms. (Gready and Robins 2014, 358)
Among these transitional justice mechanisms, Truth Commissions (TCs) 
are expected to help post-conflict societies establish the facts about past human 
rights violations, foster accountability, preserve evidence, identify perpetrators 
and recommend reparations and institutional reforms (Secretary-General 2004, 
para.50). If we consider TCs as processes, public engagement with them could 
be sustained over time.
In this document, I argue that TCs are processes that allow for mobili-
zation and participation from victims and civil society on a broader level. If we 
examine TCs as processes, we can clearly distinguish three different chronological 
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stages with different degrees of public engagement. The first stage would com-
prise the time leading to the establishment of a TC and it encompasses a period 
that could be characterized by social mobilization and participation through 
discussions, negotiations or consultations with victims and civil society. The 
second stage would comprise the time since the commission starts its work 
and up to the submission of its final report, when it ceases to exist. The third 
stage comprises the period after the submission of the commission’s final report, 
which can easily last a number of years.
In this article, I examine the relationship between victims and civil society 
with pro-democracy political parties in the lead up to the establishment of a TC 
(first stage) and after the commission’s recommendations in its final report (third 
stage). What the Nepal and Sri Lanka cases suggest is that a close relation between 
civil society and pro-democracy political parties leading to the establishment of a 
TC can limit the pressure civil society exerts on the implementation of recommen-
dations, once those pro-democracy political parties are in the new government.
There are few studies that analyze the implications of civil society and 
victims’ mobilizations prior to the establishment of TCs and in the post-commis-
sion stage. One of them examines participatory commissions as those in which 
civil society, politicians and commissioners and staff are able to “exercise agency 
with respect to the commission’s goals, procedures, and methodology” (Bakiner 
2016, 116). According to this scholar, participatory commissions are more likely 
to produce indirect political impact as civil society actors who participated in the 
process will mobilize around their recommendations (Bakiner 2016, 116). However, 
in the cases I present, it is precisely the close relationship between civil society and 
victims with political party leaders that deters mobilization once those leaders are 
part of the new government.
This article attempts to contribute to the understanding of the effects of 
TCs by examining two early commissions: the Mallik Commission established 
in Nepal in 1990 and the Zonal Commissions of Inquiry into disappearances 
established in Sri Lanka in 1994. In the first section, I explain that civil society 
and victims’ active mobilization around a TC can be analyzed as a relation 
of vertical accountability, where victims and civil society press the governing 
regime to establish a TC. Sections 2 and 3 apply the accountability framework 
to the commission established in Nepal and Sri Lanka. What the Nepal and Sri 
Lanka cases show is the existence of a continuum during the pre and post-com-
mission stages. A continuum that might explain TCs’ frequent lack of implemen-
tation of recommendations, at least in post-authoritarian settings.
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1. Truth Commissions and Accountability Relationships
I have examined the relationship between TCs and accountability (Fernandez-
Torne 2015). Specifically, TCs can generate vertical and horizontal accountability 
relationships. First, the establishment of a TC can be the result of a relationship 
of vertical accountability between civil society and the governing regime. Second, 
during the period between the establishment and the submission of the report, 
TCs hold state agencies horizontally accountable by carrying out fact-finding 
and victim tracing functions. As a result of the recommendations in the final 
report, TCs generate, first, a relationship of horizontal accountability between 
the governing regime and the state agencies towards which the recommendations 
are directed. Second, TCs’ recommendations can also generate a vertical account-
ability relationship between civil society and the governing regime. This vertical 
accountability relationship takes place when the governing regime implements 
the recommendations as a result of civil society pressure. In other words, when 
the recommendations in a TCs’ final report are used as a checklist to hold gov-
ernments accountable for their implementation.










Up to establishing a TC Civil society – governing regime
During the work of  
the commission
(Actual functions)
Fact finding Truth commission 
– State agenciesVictim tracing
As a result of the 
recommendations  









a. Vertical Accountability Relationships
In this article, I focus on vertical accountability relationships. Vertical account-
ability refers to the state being held accountable by non-state agents, mainly 
by citizens and their associations (Goetz and Jenkins 2002, 7). Elections would 
be the example of citizens holding accountable those in office. For some, elec-
toral accountability would be the only instance of vertical accountability. The 
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reason being that it is the only relationship that gives citizens formal authority 
of oversight and/or sanction over public officials. However, this narrow defini-
tion excludes many of the processes that are not based on formal authority, but 
still generate political accountability in practice (Fox 2007a, 32). Thus vertical 
accountability would also include “processes through which citizens organize 
themselves into associations capable of lobbying governments, demanding expla-
nations and threatening less formal sanctions like negative publicity” (Goetz and 
Jenkins 2002, 7). These processes can take place against those who occupy po-
sitions in state institutions, regardless of whether or not they have been elected. 
O’Donnell includes social demands to denounce wrongful acts of public author-
ities, helped by a reasonably free media, as dimensions of vertical accountability 
(O’Donnell 1999, 29-30).
Other authors refer to these processes as societal accountability, a third 
way of holding governments accountable (Ackerman 2003, 449). In processes 
of societal accountability, civil society controls the government, by exposing 
and denouncing wrongdoing, for example, through social mobilization; and by 
activating the operation of horizontal mechanisms (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 
2000, 152). What differentiates these demands in a relationship of vertical or 
societal accountability is that the state is compelled to respond. If there is no 
state answerability, the actions of citizens’ associations, movements and media 
are voice understood to describe “how citizens express their interests, react to 
governmental decision-making or the positions staked out by parties and civil 
society actors, and respond to problems in the provision of public goods” (Goetz 
and Jenkins 2002, 9).
b. Vertical Accountability and Truth Commissions
Truth Commissions can generate vertical accountability relationships at two dif-
ferent stages: first, during the period leading to the establishment of a commis-
sion and, second, as a result of the commission’s recommendations in the final 
report. In the first stage, the establishment of a TC can be the result of a relation-
ship of vertical accountability between civil society and the governing regime. In 
analyzing what has to happen to conclude that the establishment of a TC is the 
result of vertical accountability, I propose that we should evaluate whether civil 
society pressure leads the governing regime to establish a TC. The establishment of a 
TC entails an activation of a horizontal mechanism to look into the wrongdoings 
at the base of social mobilization.
Vertical accountability relationships also occur because of the recom-
mendations in a TC’s final report. The recommendations of a TC are not only 
intended for the governing regime, but also directed at the victims and broader 
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civil society. As a matter of fact, agencies of horizontal accountability, such as TCs, 
“rarely have sufficient institutional clout to be able to act on their findings, whether 
by proposing mandatory sanctions, policy changes, protection from violations, or 
compensation for past abuses” (Fox 2007b, 666). For Fox, to address these issues 
of hard accountability, it is necessary to “deal with both the nature of the governing 
regime and civil society’s capacity to encourage the institutions of public account-
ability to do their job” (Fox 2007b, 669). If the governing regime remains inactive 
and does not implement those recommendations, civil society can intercede and 
push the governing regime to do so.
It is through civil society advocacy, leadership, and persistence that the 
commission’s recommendations could eventually be implemented even when 
the governing regime lacks the will or the political clout to do so. As the spe-
cial rapporteur has pointed out, “[i]n the end, the fate of recommendations 
depends to a large extent on the leadership, advocacy and persistence of civil 
society organizations” (Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth 2013, 
para.73). Here, I propose an evaluation of whether the pressure from civil 
society leads to the implementation of a TC’s recommendations. Evaluative 
criteria are compiled in the table below.





Vertical accountability relationships 
 - Evaluative Criteria
Up to establishing TC Pressure from civil society leads the governing regime to establish a TC.
As a result of recommendations 
in the final report (Victim redress, 
Prosecutorial, Preventive)
Pressure from civil society leads to the 
implementation of a TC’s recommendations 
(usually, recommendations intended to redress 
victims, to prosecute perpetrators or to reform 
legislation or institutions to prevent future 
violations).
Source: Author.
Table 2 includes the evaluative criteria showing when a governing regime 
is held accountable by civil society. In the next section, I apply the previous 
framework to the commissions established in Nepal (1990) and in Sri Lanka 
(1994). To this end, I assess whether or not the evidence collected through doc-
umentary sources and semi-structured interviews fulfill the evaluative criteria.
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2. Case Study: The 1990 Mallik Commission in Nepal
In this section, I first present an overview of the 1990 transition from Panchayat 
regime to multiparty democracy and the role of civil society to understand the 
context in which the Mallik commission was established. Next I assess whether 
or not pressure from civil society led the governing regime to establish the Mallik 
commission; and whether or not pressure from civil society led to the implemen-
tation of the Mallik commission’s recommendations. Finally, I explain the reasons 
behind the lack of implementation.
a. The 1990 Transition and the Role of Political Parties and Civil 
Society
On February 18, 1990, the Nepali Congress (NC) and seven communist parties 
that had joined to form the United Left Front (ULF) launched the jana andolan 
(people’s movement), a peaceful and non-violent mass movement for the res-
toration of democracy against the autocratic Panchayat regime.1 Regarding the 
factors that encouraged the People’s Movement, some argue that the increase of 
international attention on human rights empowered those who were already ad-
vocating for political and social change (Adams 1998, 84). Human rights organiza-
tions, in particular, had become important in Nepal as they were allowed to exist at 
a time when political parties were banned. Since their emergence in the mid 1980s, 
they were closely linked to political parties.
Two organizations, the Human Rights Organization Nepal (HURON) 
and the Forum for Protection of Human Rights (FOPHUR), would play a 
central role during the People’s Movement. While FOPHUR was closer to the 
leftist parties, HURON was supported by the NC and others. Most of the human 
rights activists in these organizations had also been active party members. As 
a human rights activist with HURON, put it, “we used to have dual identity; we 
could neither give up our political identity, nor could we give up our new found 
identity as human rights activists” (interview Kapil Shrestha, 2014). As a result of 
this close relationship between human rights organizations and political parties, 
the latter also incorporated the human rights discourse in their strategy against 
Panchayat. In short, it was a time “of close relationship and partnership between 
democratic parties and human rights defenders” (Pyakurel 2013, 1).
Dr. Mathura Prasadh Shrestha (FOPHUR) and Devendra Raj Panday 
(HURON) emerged as key civil society leaders during the people’s movement. 
1 In 1960, King Mahendra established the Panchayat system after a “royal coup” and banned all 
political parties.
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They both coordinated the Professional Solidarity Groups, groups of citizens orga-
nized according to their profession that engaged in activism in their professional 
environment. Medical professionals played a key role in determining that the po-
lice were using a type of dum-dum bullet that had been altered so that they would 
explode inside the victim’s body (Adams 1998, 90). As a result, on February 23, 
1990 doctors organized a silent strike of two hours that was felt as legitimizing the 
protest for the public at large (Adams 1998, 93). Medical professionals also protect-
ed political leaders from arrest by placing them under hospital bed rest. Lawyers 
boycotted legal proceedings at various courts to protest the police violence against 
pro-democracy supporters (Parajulee 2000, 83).
Increased demands to respect human rights as a response to the atrocities 
committed by security forces redefined the movement (Adams 1998, 104). As a 
result, the struggle was not about allowing political parties in the system anymore, 
but about prevailing injustice committed by a repressive regime. On April 6, 
1990, amid mounting protests, the King dissolved the government and appointed 
Lokendra Bahadur (L.B.) Chand, a moderate member of the Panchayat regime, 
as the Prime Minister (PM) to form a new council of ministers. On April 8, 
1990, when the King agreed to end the ban on political parties and introduce a 
multiparty system, political party leaders declared the end of the people’s move-
ment. However, the agreement did not mention the abolishment of the Panchayat 
institutions or the formation of a new government.
On April 11, 1990, the Professional Solidarity Group issued a statement 
signed by the two civil society leaders, Mathura Prasadh Shrestha and Devendra 
Raj Pandey, appealing to the representatives of the NC and ULF to take a firm 
stand in their talks with the Monarch with respect to 1) the immediate formation 
of an interim government with representatives of various political parties; 2) the 
dissolution of all units of the Panchayat system and drafting of a new constitu-
tion; 3) honoring of and compensation to the families of those killed and provi-
sion of full and free medical attention to those injured; 4) investigation into the 
killings and repression perpetrated during the movement and punishment of those 
guilty (Adams 1998, 134-135).
On April 15, 1990, a week after political party leaders had declared the 
end of the people’s movement, several thousand people surrounded the venue 
where PM Chand was meeting with leaders of the NC and ULF and kept the 
negotiators virtually under siege for several hours. Prime Minister Chand subse-
quently resigned (Parajulee 2000, 93). On the morning of April 16, King Birendra 
announced the dissolution of the National Legislature and other Panchayat 
structures, officially abolishing the Panchayat regime. During the two months 
of protests, forty-five people had been killed and thousands injured. On April 
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19, the king invited NC leader K.P Bhattarai to form a transitional government, 
known as the “interim” government, with a one-year mandate to draft a new 
constitution, call for elections, and handover the government to a democratically 
elected government. The interim government included eleven members: PM 
Bhattarai, three members from NC and three from ULF; two members nominated 
by the King; and two from independent citizens, Devendra Raj Panday as Finance 
Minister and Dr. Mathura Prasadh Shrestha as Minster of Public Health. Talking 
about his appointment, Dr. Shrestha explained,
I was made Minster without my consent. I did not want to join the 
ministry but Man Mohan Adhikari [ULF] and then Prime Minister K.P. 
Bhattarai [NC] came and said: for good or bad, we made the decision be-
lieving that you would agree (…) But if you don’t join, people may not trust 
us, they will ask questions and we will have problems or even crises. I joined 
without actually wanting to join. (Shrestha 2014)
The move to include these two civil society leaders in the transitional gov-
ernment was to make the new government more legitimate vis-á-vis the people. 
Through taking them on board PM Bhattarai was placing the people’s leaders by 
the government’s side. The next section assess whether or not pressure from civil 
society led the governing regime to establish the Mallik commission.
b. Assessing the Existence of Vertical Accountability Relationships 
as a Result of the Mallik Commission
In this section, I examine whether or not the evidence collected from 
semi-structured interviews and primary and secondary documentary sources 
fulfills the evaluative criteria proposed in Table 2.
Vertical Accountability Leading to the Establishment  
of the Mallik Commission
Evidence gathered suggests that the pressure from civil society led the governing 
regime to establish the Mallik Commission. On February 25, 1990, one week 
after the people’s movement began, human rights organizations demanded an im-
mediate judicial investigation into the unnecessary force against demonstrators 
and strong actions against the persons responsible (Final Report of the Mallik 
Commission 1990, Preface). On March 1, the Nepal Medical Association issued its 
first press release, denouncing the killing of demonstrators and torture in deten-
tion centers and demanding “that an independent judicial inquiry be instituted 
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and the findings of this commission be made public” (Adams 1998, 96-97). On 
March 13, 48 writers and poets issued a joint press statement, expressing their 
rage at torture and killings of protesters and demanding the formation of “an 
impartial investigation committee to look into these incidents” (Final Report of 
the Mallik Commission 1990, Preface). As a result, on April 6, newly appointed 
PM Chand established a commission of inquiry “to investigate into the damages 
inflicted by the recent incidents in the nation and to submit a report” (Final 
Report of the Mallik Commission 1990, Preface) with Justice Prachanda Raj Anil 
as the Chairperson. The Anil Commission was established by the Panchayat gov-
ernment as a response to pressure from civil society.
However, people did not consider the Anil commission legitimate because 
it had been appointed by Panchayat PM Chand, and they mobilized against it. 
Moreover, the commission’s mandate only referred to investigating the “damages 
inflicted” but did not refer explicitly to the killing of civilians. The Chand gov-
ernment only lasted 10 days and, on April 19, the new interim government was 
formed under PM Bhattarai. The interim government appointed Kapil Shrestha 
and Prakash Kafle, two representatives from human rights organizations, as com-
missioners in a move to legitimate the Anil Commission. Their refusal to join 
along with mounting pressure from civil society led to the resignation of Judge 
Anil and its members.
On May 23, one week after the dissolution of the Anil Commission, the 
new interim government led by PM Bhattarai appointed another commission 
with Judge Janardan Mallik as the chairperson. The mandate of the new Mallik 
Commission explicitly mentioned investigation into the killings during the move-
ment, the naming of the perpetrators, and advising the government on further 
actions (Final Report of the Mallik Commission 1990, 1). These developments 
suggest the interim government was rendered accountable to civil society. Civil 
society mobilization against the Anil Commission led to its dissolution and the 
appointment of the Mallik Commission, with a clear mandate to investigate the 
killings, name perpetrators, and recommend actions.
Vertical Accountability as a Result of the  
Mallik Recommendations
In their final reports, TCs make recommendations for the governing regime to 
implement. In case these recommendations are not implemented, civil society can 
press the government to implement them. I examine whether or not civil society 
mobilized to implement the recommendations and whether or not this mobili-
zation led to the implementation of the Mallik Commission recommendations.
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Civil society mobilization revolved around two main objectives: the offi-
cial publication of the Mallik Commission’s report, and the prosecution of those 
responsible. Here, I examine the short and medium-term position of civil society.
Short-term (one year)
On December 31, 1990, the Commission submitted the final report to the interim 
government. PM K.P. Bhattarai had decided not to act upon the final report, as his 
interim government had less than four months left in office. Moreover, his main 
priority was to hold elections, the first democratic elections since 1959. Devendra 
Raj Panday, then Minister of Finance on behalf of civil society, recalls,
[Prime Minister] K.P. Bhattarai wanted the next elected government to 
decide on the report. That’s where Mathura, Nilambar [Nilambar Acharya, 
Minister of Law and Justice] and myself come in: we didn’t let him do that. 
No, it’s our commission! We have people outside, how could I show my 
face to the human rights community? The Prime Minister’s response was 
to request the formation of a sub-committee [to decide on the next steps] 
including the Home Minister, Nilambar and myself. But we never got to 
do the formal business because the Home Minister was part of the team 
[the Home Minister was one of the two Ministers nominated by the King]. 
(interview Panday 2014)
Finally, it was decided to send the Mallik Commission’s report to the 
Attorney General for implementation. The Decision and Opinion of the Interim 
Government in relation to the Mallik Commission Report, adopted by the Council 
of Ministers on February 1, 1991, contained three main decisions (Council of 
Ministers 1991). The first was to acknowledge the submission of the Mallik 
Commission’s report and to send it to the Attorney General for further actions. 
Second, to seize passports and impose a ban to leave the country on all members 
of the two Panchayat governments to which end the use of excessive force had 
been authorized. The third decision was to take no action against the Nepal Police 
on the basis that the police was involved in atrocities due to the faulty system 
and that the government needed them to hold impartial and peaceful elections. 
Thus, instead of punishing perpetrators in the police force, the interim govern-
ment offered an amnesty in exchange for their support to conduct the elections.
The interim government did not officially publish the Mallik Commission’s 
report. Instead, it was leaked to the media and the newspapers published the 
main findings. Patma Ratna Thuladar, civil society activist, recalls strong voices 
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from civil society asking for the report to be made public and perpetrators to 
be punished (interview Thuladar 2015). Nevertheless, the situation had changed 
and the pressure from civil society was no longer as strong, partly because civil 
society was directing the pressure towards their government. Mr. Thuladar re-
flects on this: “The problem was very serious for civil society and human rights 
groups because the government was run by their own leaders” (interview Thuladar 
2015). R.K Mainali points specifically at those leaders who were in the interim 
government representing civil society: “some civil society activists protested, they 
demanded the publication of the Mallik report, but they did not organize mass 
protests against it. Mathura [Dr. Mathura Shrestha] and Devendra [Devendra Raj 
Panday] were in the Cabinet” (interview Mainali 2015). As well as these two civil 
society representatives, the political leaders from the NC and the ULF were the 
people’s leaders also. According to one of the ministers representing civil society, 
this weakened the civil society as “it became difficult [in 1990] for lawyers, pro-
fessors, university teachers, school teachers to put pressure on the government, 
which was NC and ULF, because it is their leaders” (interview Panday 2014).
The first democratic elections since 1959, held on May 12, 1991, further 
softened civil society’s stand on the Mallik Commission’s report. First, the elec-
tion campaign weakened civil society, polarized by competing political parties. 
Second, representatives from civil society and human rights organizations for-
mally became political party members. A doctor who was an activist during the 
People’s Movement, reflects on the reasons why civil society pressure vanished: 
“the human rights movement became orphan; after multiparty democracy, peo-
ple could engage with political parties, so civil society people were recruited as 
members” (interview Boghendra Sharma 2015). After the 1991 elections, civil 
society remained divided according to party lines (interview Acharya 2015).
On July 8, 1991, G.P. Koirala, the Prime Minister of the first elected NC 
government, presented the Mallik Commission’s report to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives along with the decision of the interim government, 
from February 1, 1991, and the advice of the Attorney General, from July 7, 1991, 
“pointing out that the report was of public importance” (The Independent 1991). 
In his opinion, the Attorney General had alleged that the Mallik Commission 
report had failed to specify the legal basis to punish those responsible and had 
failed to provide enough evidence. Beyond a debilitated civil society, the focus of 
the government had changed completely. Minister Acharya stressed the need for the 
first elected government to implement the new constitution and to deal with other 
priorities. In this new relationship, between the newly elected-government and a 
palace without official power, the former was not ready to implement the Mallik 
Commission’s report (interview Acharya 2015).
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Medium term (five years)
In August 1992, one and a half years after the submission of the Mallik 
Commission’s report, the issue of prosecuting those named surfaced again. On 
August 21, 1992, with mounting pressure from the opposition, Prime Minister 
G.P. Koirala asserted in Parliament that it was impossible to initiate actions 
against anyone implicated in the Mallik report without concrete evidence. The 
opinion of then Attorney General was used again as the rationale for this argu-
ment. The statement caused the Commission’s Chairperson Janardan Mallik to 
publicly state, “[t]he [Prime Minister] himself has not perhaps read the report” 
(The Independent 1992) and “[t]he [A]ttorney [G]eneral is not the only person 
who knows about laws, there are people who know even better” (The Commoner 
1992). Chairperson Mallik was also quoted by the media as stating, “[t]he report 
does not lack evidence but the government is not implementing it to protect its 
own position” (The Independent 1992).
Devendra Raj Pandey and Nilambar Acharya, former Ministers of the 
interim government, also criticized the Prime Minister’s statement against prose-
cution, alleging that “by refusing to take action against the Panchayat chiefs who 
suppressed the historic Jana Andolan through terror and killings, [the Prime 
Minister’s statement] reflects a lack of intent to consolidate democracy” (The 
Independent 1992). They further criticized the government for “promoting 
and rewarding several individuals associated with the previous regime, in-
cluding those who have been implicated in the Mallik Commission report” 
and charged against the leadership of the opposition, the Communist Party 
of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) party, for “not being firm in its commit-
ment to see that the Mallik Commission report is fully implemented” (The 
Independent 1992).
The pressure from the public was enough to force the government to re-
spond. As reported at the time, “due to escalating public pressure to implement 
the report the Prime Minister decided to constitute a ‘study group’ to take up the 
matter” (The Independent 1992). Radheshyam Adhikari, lawyer and then Member 
of Parliament for the NC, recalls a meeting of the study group where then Prime 
Minister G.P. Koirala concluded the meeting saying, “[the Mallik Commission 
report] is a document of that time. It will be preserved for the history, but now 
nobody will be prosecuted” (interview Adhikari, 2015). The decision was strongly 
protested. Patma Ratna Thuladar, then Member of Parliament, recalls, “I myself was 
in the parliament and some of us shouted very loudly that the commission report 
should be accepted by the government formally and then [the government] should 
take strong action against all those named, one by one” (interview Thuladar, 2015).
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On July 12, 1994, King Birendra dissolved the popularly elected House of 
Representatives on the recommendation of Prime Minister G.P. Koirala. During 
its time in office between June 1991 and July 1994, the NC government did not 
publish or implement the recommendations contained in the Mallik report. 
Nonetheless, the report was still a pending issue on the agenda of human rights 
organizations. Sushil Pyakhurel, human rights activist, recalls, “because we had 
access to UML [the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist)], we 
lobbied them to put in their manifesto for the elections that if you will be in 
power, you will do two things: set up a human rights commission and publish 
the Mallik report; and they agreed” (interview Sushil Pyakhurel, 2014). Thus, the 
1994 Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) election manifesto 
stated, on page 30, “the violators of human rights shall be prosecuted according 
to the law; the reports of the Mallik Commission and Committee to Investigate 
the Disappeared Persons after 2017 BS (1960) shall be made public and they shall 
be implemented” (INHURED International 1995, 26).
The Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) won the elections 
in November 1994, securing 88 of the 205 seats, and formed a minority govern-
ment. However, the new government did not implement the Mallik Commission 
report. It did not publish it either. It was INHURED International, human rights 
organization, that photocopied and published the report, making it accessible to 
the general public in 1994 (INHURED International 1995, 24).2 Interviewees who 
represent civil society and the human rights movement see the fact that the Mallik 
Commission report was neither published nor implemented as their failure. They 
agree that the way civil society was organized around political parties weakened 
their demand for publication and implementation of the report.
Civil society pressure was not enough for the government to publish the 
Mallik report or to prosecute alleged perpetrators named in the report. The failed 
implementation of the recommendations compiled in the Mallik Commission 
report as a result of civil society mobilization, demonstrates a lack of vertical 
accountability relationships between civil society and the governing regime.
c. Explaining the Lack of Implementation of Recommendations
As for the failure to implement the recommendations, the main reason for this 
was the limited pressure from civil society on the government. Civil society 
2 Since the new elected Prime Minister presented the Mallik report to the speaker of the House 
of Representatives, on July 8, 1991, the report had been stored at the Parliamentary Secretariat. 
According to its own publication, INHURED International made copies of the report by fol-
lowing the due process through a letter of request. The date of the INHURED International 
publication of the Mallik Report is Nepali year 2051, which corresponds to 1994.
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pressure, which was very strong before the Mallik Commission was established, 
became weak after the new governing regime was established. The main reason 
was the close relationship between civil society and political parties in Nepal. 
Civil society activists who had been protesting on the streets and calling to 
punish those who had killed demonstrators, also had their political affiliation. 
Some of them were political party members. After the ban on political parties 
was lifted, these activists officially became political party members who had to 
follow the party discipline. Such party discipline was dependent on the compro-
mise that political leaders had reached with the King, and which excluded any 
prospect of prosecuting figures from the previous regime. As former Minister 
Panday explained, talking hypothetically,
I am a human rights person until April 18, 1990; I am associated with 
Nepali Congress, but I would not say that openly. Once parties were legal-
ized, I could say it openly: I am a party member. Under the party, I have 
to be under the discipline. When the party people are running the human 
rights movement, they can’t put as much pressure [on the government]. 
This constraint is very important. (interview Panday 2014)
A second reason for the softening of civil society mobilization against the 
government is that it is now their government. The 1990 interim government 
was the result of civil society and ordinary people’s mobilization through the 
People’s Movement. People would not organize mass protests against it. Further, 
this government had included not only the political party leaders, but also the 
civil society leaders. The following 1991 NC, and 1994 Communist Party of Nepal 
(United Marxist Leninist) governments were the result of democratic elections. 
It was the people who voted for these parties. This led to limited mobilization 
against the government.
To conclude, the level of the pressure that rendered the governing 
regime accountable to the demands of civil society before the commission was 
established, did not exist when the time came for civil society to mobilize for the 
implementation of recommendations. I have identified two reasons for this lack 
of pressure. First, the close relations between civil society and political parties 
in Nepal; and, second, the fact that, with the new regime in government, civil 
society had to protest now against their government, the one they had fought 
to establish. Later on, the celebration of the first democratic elections further 
softened civil society’s stand on the Mallik Commission’s report as civil society 
became polarized along political party lines.
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3. Case Study: The 1994 Zonal Commissions in Sri Lanka
The section on Sri Lanka follows the same structure as the previous. First, I 
present the context of the 1994 transition and the role of political parties and 
civil society. Next, I assess the existence of vertical accountability relationships as 
a result of the Zonal Commissions. Finally, I explain the possible reasons behind 
the lack of implementation of the commission’s recommendations.
a. The 1994 Transition and the Role of Political Parties  
and Civil Society
In 1987, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) (People’s Liberation Front), a 
radical leftist armed group, lunched its second armed insurgency against the Sri 
Lankan government, at the time, under the United National Party (UNP). This 
armed insurrection affected mainly the South and Central part of the country. The 
response of the state security forces was brutal. Estimates indicate around 50,000 
people were killed or disappeared during the two years of JVP armed insurgency, 
known as the years of terror. At the same time, the Government of Sri Lanka was 
fighting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the North and Eastern 
part of the country. On June 11, 1990, the ceasefire agreed between the LTTE 
and the UNP Government broke after the LTTE massacred 600 police officers. 
The police massacre started the Eelam War II, which lasted until January 1995. 
In November 1994, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga won the presidential 
elections under the People’s Alliance, a platform of leftist and minority parties in 
the opposition, signaling the end of seventeen years of UNP government, which 
had turned extremely repressive.
During the years prior to the victory of President Kumaratunga, the 
relations between victims, civil society and the political parties in the opposi-
tion became very close. In Sri Lanka, the human rights campaign to find the 
whereabouts of thousands of people who had been forcibly disappeared became 
the thrust that united victims and human rights organizations with the political 
parties in the opposition. The campaign against enforced disappearances became 
a political campaign to defeat the UNP, in office since 1977. I examine these 
relations next.
The Relation Between Political Parties and Victim Groups
The link between victims and political parties originated from the despair of fami-
lies to find their disappeared. This desperation led Wijayadasa Pathirana, whose son 
Sudath had disappeared, to contact Vasudeva Nanayakkara, a Member of Parliament 
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for the Nava Sam Samaja Party (NSSP), a party in the opposition, after having ex-
hausted all other options. Vasudeva Nanayakkara and Vickramabahu Karunarathna, 
the NSSP leaders, had formed an underground organization collecting information 
concerning the disappeared. Karunarathna recalls that he started working on this 
cause because, “parents would come to our places and tell us, assuming we had 
some contact with people taken into custody, and we intervened. That is how we 
got into the process as politicians. By 1989, insurgency was over, but large numbers 
were getting arrested, so we continued” (interview Karunarathna 2015).
In April 1990, Wijayadasa Pathirana established with the support of the 
NSSP leaders, Nanayakkara and Karunarathna, the Organization of the Parents 
and Family Members of the Disappeared. The organization had four major de-
mands for the government; 1) appointing independent commissions to establish 
the truth, 2) punishing the perpetrators, 3) compensating the family members, 
and 4) releasing the political prisoners (interview Pathirana 2015).
According to a civil society activist, the initial work by Nanayakkara and 
Karunarathna of the NSSP to increase the opposition against disappearances 
strengthened the main opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). 
“Mahinda Rajapaksa was then a friend of Vasudeva [Nanayakkara]. I suppose he 
[Rajapaksa] was politically smart enough to position himself there, knowing that 
people were disappearing from his area, to link up and begin to support [the] 
NSSP to raise these issues” (interview Nimalka Fernando, 2015).
On July 15, 1990, the first branch of the Southern Mothers’ Front was 
inaugurated in the southern district of Matara under the auspices of Mahinda 
Rajapaksa and Mangala Samaraweera, both SLFP’s Members of Parliament. 
Around 1,500 women from the Matara district attended the meeting to elect 
office bearers to coordinate the work of the group. Within six months, branches 
had been established in 10 other districts under the patronage of Members of 
Parliament of the SLFP from the respective area (Alwis 2008, 154).
On February 19, 1991, the Southern Mothers’ Front held its first convention 
at the Town Hall in Colombo. The 10 resolutions passed unanimously at this 
meeting, called, among others,
2. That the government appoint a fully powered independent Commission, 
free from state interference and including Supreme Court Judges, to verify 
the facts around arbitrary arrests and detention.
3. That the government pay compensation to the dependents of the disap-
peared as well as for damage of house and property.
5. That the government issue death certificates to the dependents of the 
disappeared and alleviate their trauma. (De Mel 2001 245).
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After the meeting, the first national rally was held with over 15,000 
people attending (Alwis 2008, 169). Addressing the mothers at the rally, Dr. 
Manorani Saravanamuttu, the mother of assassinated journalist Richard de 
Soyza, emphasized that the Southern Mothers Front would act as a peaceful 
watchdog on whatever government was in power. Nevertheless, she did indi-
cate the organization’s linkage with the SLFP as a measure of protection, given 
the insecurity at the time. The narrow focus of the Southern Mothers’ Front on 
disappearances in the context of the political violence in the South between 1987 
and 1990, in addition to its close links to the SLFP, led to the appropriation of 
the organization and its demands by the party. The SLFP eventually used the 
Southern Mothers’ Front to overthrow the UNP government and secure polit-
ical power (Samuel 2006, 21). The mothers of the disappeared had managed to 
create a space for protest, under the organizational umbrella of the Southern 
Mother’s Front, at a time when dissenting voices were suppressed. Nevertheless, 
this space was then captured by the SLFP for oppositional politics. Chandrika 
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the Prime Ministerial candidate for the People’s 
Alliance, a front of political parties formed to defeat the UNP, captured the 
mothers’ grief for political purposes during the campaigns for the August 1994 
general elections. As Alwis writes,
Herself a grieving widow and mother, she cleverly articulated the mothers’ 
suffering as both a personal and national experience; she too “sorrowed 
and wept” with them but also made it clear that she was capable of trans-
lating her grief into action, of building a new land where “other mothers 
will not suffer what we suffer.” (Alwis 2008, 170)
There is a shared understanding among human rights practitioners that 
political party leaders in the opposition at the time “had ‘used’ or ‘hijacked’ 
the movement against disappearances, especially the organizations of moth-
ers and families of the disappeared, to consolidate their own political bases” 
(Wijewardene and Nagaraj 2014, 97). The Southern Mothers’ Front disintegrat-
ed with the electoral victory of the People’s Alliance (Samuel 2006, 22). The 
November 1994 elections resulted in Kumaratunga becoming the 5th President 
of Sri Lanka. The two SLFP leaders who also belonged to the Southern Mother’s 
Front, Mahinda Rajapaksa and Mangala Samaraweera, became the Minister of 
Labor and Minister of Post and Telecommunications, respectively. Being de-
pendent on the SLFP for its leadership, the Southern Mothers’ Front could not 
convert itself into a politically independent watchdog body envisaged by Dr. 
Manorani Saravanamuttu (Samuel 2006, 23).
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The Relation Between Political Parties and Human Rights Groups
As in the case of victims, civil society also engaged with political party leaders as 
they offered protection. According to a human rights activist, the engagement of 
the civil society with the political movements began at the period of terror be-
tween 1988 and 1989. Political parties could offer protective cover when civil so-
ciety activists were threatened. Such protections by political parties were offered 
in two ways. First, Members of Parliament were in general guarded by the police. 
The then President J.R. Jayawardena had also provided arms to those who sup-
ported the July 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, including Vasudeva Nanayakara 
and Vickramabahu Karunarathna of the NSSP (interview Nimalka Fernando, 2015). 
Because of this security protection offered to Members of Parliament, civil so-
ciety had them engage in activities that could run certain risks. For example, 
in September 1990, NSSP Vasudeva Nanayakara and SLFP Mahinda Rajapaksa 
attended the 31st session of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearance in Geneva and described, to the world, the atrocities that were 
taking place in Sri Lanka. At the airport in Colombo, the police confiscated the 
533 documents Rajapaksa was carrying that contained information about missing 
persons and 19 pages of photographs. Nonetheless, he was allowed to travel to 
Geneva, attend the working group session, and share the detailed accounts of the 
atrocities perpetrated by the UNP government (Bastians 2014).
Civil society support to Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s election 
campaign in 1994 was crucial to understand the relation between civil society 
and the political parties in the opposition. A recent study that examines the 
evolving relationship between political parties and human rights activists in 
Sri Lanka refers to “significant sections of the community of human rights 
practitioners being closely involved in supporting the election of Chandrika 
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga as President” (Wijewardene and Nagaraj 2014, 95). 
Similarly, many of the people I interviewed referred to civil society involvement 
in Kumaratunga’s campaign. One of the interviewees explained,
So you got a situation in which civil society in this country, which by and 
large in terms of those working on human rights, democracy and all of 
that, has a kind of left orientation, had absolutely no hesitation in being 
sympathetic supporters or, in fact, part of the Chandrika campaign. (in-
terview Saravanamuttu 2014)
Another interviewee expressed, “it’s not that you have independent civil 
society just waiting somewhere, like in cold storage, until the change happens 
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and when change happens they are called. No, they were part of the campaign” 
(interview Gunawardena 2014).
Human rights activists’ involvement went beyond the electoral campaign; 
they also became engaged in the Kumaratunga administration, formally or infor-
mally (Wijewardene and Nagaraj 2014, 95). This involvement of activists with the 
administration blurred the distinction between civil society and the government. 
Consequently, the rules of engagement between human rights practitioners and 
the state changed during the time of Kumaratunga in ways that human rights 
practice “was seen as more muted and domesticated” (Wijewardene and Nagaraj 
2014, 96). As one of the interviewees noted, “civil society was not as critical with 
the government as it ought to have been” (interview Saravanamuttu 2014).
The result was a government that had come to power with the support of 
victims and human rights activists and that was now in a position to silence the 
same people. As a women’s rights campaigner explained, “women of the Mothers’ 
Front were compromised by compensation and jobs given by the new [People’s 
Alliance] government when it came to power” (Dulsie de Silva, interview quoted 
in Thomson-Senanayake 2014, 225). It was not only the Southern Mothers’ Front 
that were compromised, human rights practitioners were too. As Thomson notes,
Concerns were also raised that many within the human rights community 
had compromised their independence by publicly lending their support 
to the [People’s Alliance] and even securing government positions. They 
found themselves in a weakened position at the very moment the People’s 
Alliance should have been called to account to realize its election promis-
es. (Thomson-Senanayake 2014, 226)
The next section assesses the existence of vertical accountability relation-
ships as a result of the Zonal Commissions.
b. Assessing the Existence of Vertical Accountability Relationships 
as a Result of the Zonal Commissions
Here, I assess whether or not the evidence collected demonstrates the existence 
of vertical accountability relationships.
Vertical Accountability Leading to the Establishment of the 
Zonal Commissions
If the pressure from civil society leads the governing regime to establish a TC, the 
state is being made answerable to civil society demands. I sustain that victims 
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and civil society demands led the government to establish the Zonal COIs. 
The demand to establish a COI to look into disappearances was a victims’ de-
mand. As early as February 1991, the Mothers Front had unanimously passed 
a resolution calling the government “to appoint a fully powered independent 
Commission, free from state interference and including Supreme Court Judges, 
to verify the facts around arbitrary arrests and detention” (De Mel 2001, 245). 
However, the UNP government rejected the establishment of any COI to look in-
to disappearances during the years of terror, from 1988 to 1989, when 50,000 peo-
ple had allegedly been forcibly disappeared. Instead, in 1991, the UNP government 
established a COI to look into disappearances happening in the following twelve 
months, involuntary removals that had not yet occurred. A new Commission was 
appointed in 1992 and 1993 with the same mandate (Law & Society Trust 2010, 
20). After President Premadasa was assassinated on May 1, 1993 by an LTTE sui-
cide bomber, new President Dingiri Banda Wijetunga revoked the warrants of the 
previous three commissions. In August 1993, he appointed another Commission 
to investigate involuntary removals of persons during the period between 1991 
and 1993. None of the reports of these four commissions were made public (Law 
& Society Trust 2010, 24). It was against this background of the UNP government 
opposition to investigating disappearances during the 1988–1989 period, that the 
1994 elections took place.
In both the parliamentary elections in August 1994 and the presidential 
elections in November 1994, the People’s Alliance, a platform of leftist and mi-
nority parties in the opposition, was contesting the elections promising inves-
tigation into disappearances. Specifically, the then opposition leader Chandrika 
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga promised a thorough investigation into disappear-
ances and speedy actions on past human rights abuses (Commission of Inquiry 
1998, Introduction). After the victory of the People’s Alliance at the parliamen-
tary elections in August 1994, the new government began the task of appointing 
three Zonal Commissions to investigate disappearances since 1988 (Commission 
of Inquiry 1998, Introduction). However, the government could not establish the 
COIs because of the disagreement by the UNP President who argued against 
their establishment (Commission of Inquiry 1998, Introduction).
During the three-month interval between the parliamentarian and presi-
dential elections, the Prime Minister’s Office under Kumaratunga’s direction, had 
responded to letters sent by relatives of the disappeared. The Office promised 
that, in case of winning the Presidential elections, the new President would 
appoint a COI into disappearances and that measures would be taken to pay 
compensation to the affected families (Interim Reports of the Southern COI 1997, 
37-39). The establishment of the COI, not possible under a UNP President, and 
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the payment of compensation to all those victimized became, once again, a central 
issue during the November 1994 Presidential elections. On November 30, 1994, 
only 18 days after winning the elections, new President Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga issued the Presidential decree establishing the three COI. In doing 
so, the new governing regime became answerable to the citizens.
Vertical Accountability as a Result of the Zonal Commissions’ 
Recommendations
The three Commissions made extensive recommendations dealing with repa-
rations. Among others, they recommended the payment of economic compensa-
tion to the relatives of the disappeared. In practice, the amounts the government 
provided were less than those recommended by the Commissions and most of 
the other recommendations intended to redress victims were not implemented. 
Recommendations to collect information on the location of mass graves and identi-
ties of bodies alleged to be buried and to exhume burial sites were not implemented.
The COIs also recommended the prosecution of perpetrators. Following 
recommendations by the Southern and Central Commission, the Government es-
tablished in November 1997 the Disappearances Investigation Unit (DIU). It also 
established, in July 1998, the Missing Persons Commissions Unit (MPU) (the 
unit in charge of cases of disappearances within the Attorney General’s office). 
The police DIU investigated thousands of cases on the basis of the outcome of 
the fact-finding carried out by the Commissions, which led to the Attorney gen-
eral’s MPU starting criminal proceedings against 597 security forces personnel. 
However, only 12 perpetrators out of 597 security forces personnel prosecuted were 
convicted as of 2004, most of them junior officers. Finally, the government did not 
implement most of the COIs recommendations intended to remove perpetrators 
from public office or to adopt institutional or legal reforms to avoid repetition.3
Despite that fact that most of the recommendations the Commissions 
made were not implemented, victim groups and civil society in Sri Lanka did not 
press the governing regime to do so. Only in one instance, the Secretary-General 
of the Organization of the Parents and Family Members of the Disappeared filed 
a case against the Deputy Inspector General circular directing the reinstatement 
of all officers who had been interdicted and charged in courts, but subsequent-
ly bailed out. In response to the writ, the Court quashed the circular on the 
grounds that officers against whom criminal proceedings had started should 
3 For an overview of the actions undertaken by the government of Sri Lanka as a result of the 
COI report, see: Fernandez Torne (2017).
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not be reinstated (Law & Society Trust 2010, 94, footnote 124). Other than that, 
there was no pressure from victims or civil society on the governing regime 
to implement the Commissions’ recommendations. Even if such pressure had 
existed, it was not enough to render the governing regime accountable to the 
demands from victims and civil society. Consequently, there were no vertical 
accountability relationships between civil society and the governing regime as a 
result of the Commissions’ recommendations.
c. Explaining the Lack of Implementation of Recommendations
The analysis above shows a governing regime that is held to account by civil so-
ciety and victims to establish a COI but this same civil society did not exert pres-
sure on the governing regime to implement the Commissions’ recommendations.
The Sri Lankan case indicates that close relations of victims and civil society 
with political party leaders prior to the establishment of a commission, could have 
detrimental consequences for a long term-success of a TC as the former cannot 
effectively pressure the government to act on its recommendations. Concerning 
victims, the political leaders on whom victims needed to put pressure were the 
same leaders who had founded the victims’ movements. The president of a victim’s 
organization noted that political leaders had led the victims’ movement since the 
beginning and those same leaders became part of the government. As he expressed,
When political leaders who had supported victims became Ministers, their 
[the victims’] heroes are in the government. And they are promising and 
the promises are being implemented, the Commissions are coming, the 
Commissions are listening and there were very few cases coming out. So 
the people just thought they would do something. (…) We thought good 
results will come, in fact good results came, but no one pushed those rec-
ommendations to be implemented against the government. That was the 
main problem. (interview Brito Fernando 2014)
Others refer to political party leaders “using” or “hijacking” “the move-
ment against disappearances, especially the organizations of mothers and families 
of the disappeared, to consolidate their own political bases” (interview with hu-
man rights practitioners in Wijewardene and Nagaraj 2014, 97). The Organization 
of the Parents and Family Members of the Disappeared legal advisor recalls 
meeting with President Kumaratunga. “We submitted a memorandum asking 
for the recommendations to be implemented. But then, the leaders forgot all the 
promises they had made” (interview Kumarage 2015).
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Concerning the role of civil society, there is an understanding that there 
was no pressure on the government to implement the recommendations. As a 
human rights lawyer, expressed,
From my perception and my recollection, there was no pressure at all. There 
was not pressure and, therefore, [the government] was allowed to get away with 
not implementing or just ignoring the recommendations and just focusing on 
paying some money and that was it. (interview Pinto-Jayawardena 2014)
There is also an understanding that the lack of pressure was linked to 
the close relationship between civil society and the government of President 
Kumaratunga. Particularly, human rights practitioners were “closely involved in 
supporting the election of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga as president 
and engaged in her administration, formally or informally” (Wijewardene and 
Nagaraj 2014, 95). As a member from civil society reflected,
In Chandrika’s time, resistance was not possible because everyone was a friend. 
Everybody who worked with her was a friend (...) So civil society became weak 
during Chandrika’s time, our autonomy could not be safeguarded. We became 
part and parcel of that process. (interview Nimalka Fernando 2015)
4. Conclusions
Both cases show pressure by civil society and victims was limited when their 
governments did not implement the Commissions’ recommendations. In Nepal, 
limited pressure was due to the fact that civil society had been absorbed by the 
system and, when the time to implement the recommendations came, civil society 
was part of the governing regime. With the legalization of political parties, civil 
society activists formally became political party members who had to follow the 
party discipline. Such party discipline was constrained by the compromise political 
leaders had reached with the King, which excluded any prospect of prosecuting 
figures from the previous regime. The public’s reluctance to organize mass pro-
tests against their elected government, the one they had fought for, also contrib-
uted to low levels of pressure.
Similarly, in Sri Lanka, civil society and victim groups did not press the 
governing regime to implement the Commissions’ recommendations. This was 
due to the close relationships between victims, civil society representatives, and 
political leaders who became part of the new governing regime. These political 
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leaders had founded the victims’ movements. As for civil society activists, they 
had been actively involved in supporting the election of President Kumaratunga. 
When the time to put the pressure on arrived, many within civil society were not 
monitoring the new government. Instead, they had become engaged, formally or 
informally, in the new administration.
Both cases, Nepal and Sri Lanka, show that relations between victims, 
civil society and political parties leading to the establishment of a commission, 
hindered social mobilization for the implementation of recommendations. In 
Nepal and Sri Lanka, the internal dynamics explain and frame the limited or 
complete lack of mobilization in support of the implementation of the commis-
sions’ recommendations.
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Appendix 1 – List of interviewees in Nepal (quoted)
Governing regime
Former Ministers in Krishna Prasadh Bhattarai’s interim government 
from 1990
1. Mathura Prasadh Shrestha. Former Minster of Public Health. Former President 
of FOPHUR. April 13, 2014, Kathmandu.
2. Devendra Raj Panday. Former Minister of Finance. Finance secretary under 
Panchayat system but resigned in 1980. Associated with HURON. April 13, 2014, 
Kathmandu.
3. Nilamber Acharya. Former Minister of Law and Justice. Responsible for the 
finalization of the 1990 draft constitution. March 23, 2015, Kathmandu.
Political Party members in Government
4. Radha Krishna Mainali. Acting chairperson of the United Left Front, during 
the People’s Movement. March 25, 2015, Kathmandu. Interview with interpreter.
Civil society, victims
Independent Member of Parliament
5. Padma Ratna Thuladar. Civil society, independent. In 1986, during Panchayat 
regime, Member of the National Assembly from Kathmandu. March 24, 2015, 
Kathmandu.
Professional solidarity group
6. Kapil Shrestha. Teacher Union, human rights activist with HURON. In 1990, 
he was appointed commissioner from civil society in the Anil commission but 
resigned. April 9, 2014, Kathmandu.
7. Radheshyam Adhikari. Lawyer and civil society activist. After the Jana An-
dolan, he became politically active with the Nepali Congress. March 25, 2015, 
Kathmandu.
8. Boghendra Sharma. Doctor and human rights activist. Founder of the Center 
for Victims of Torture Nepal (CVICT). March 27, 2015, Kathmandu.
Human Rights
9. Sushil Pyakhurel. FOPHUR, April 16, 2014, Kathmandu.
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Appendix 2 – List of interviewees in Sri Lanka (quoted)
Civil society, victims
Human Rights
1. Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena. Legal analyst whose work encompasses advocacy, re-
search and litigation in the protection of civil liberties, October 21, 2014, Colombo.
2. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu. Executive director, Center for Policy Alternatives, 
October 22, 2014, Colombo.
3. Nimalka Fernando. Lawyer and human rights activist. At the time of the com-
missions involved with the Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality and 
with the Women’s Action Committee. Also secretary to the development commis-
sion of the National Christian Council. Associated the Nava Sama Samaja Party. 
July 1, 2015, Colombo.
4. Sudharshana Gunawardena. Attorney-at-Law. Supported the commission 
through his work in the Movement for the Defense of Democratic Rights. Oc-
tober 21, 2014, Colombo.
Political Party member in the opposition
5. Vickramabahu Karunarathna. Political leader, Nava Sama Samaja Party and 
Patron of the Organization of Parents and Family Members of the Disappeared. 
June 29, 2015, Colombo.
Victims
6. Shantha Pathirana. Secretary-General Organization of Parents and Family 
Members of the Disappeared. July 2, 2015, Colombo.
People working with victims
7. Chandra Pala Kumarage. Legal advisor of the Organization of Parents and 
Family Members of the Disappeared. July 1, 2015, Colombo.
8. Brito Fernando. President of the Families of the Disappeared. October 23, 2014, 
Negombo
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